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Conventional wisdom has it that trade en-
hances economic efficiency and thus promotes
growth. At least since Robert M. Solow’s
(1957) pioneering work, however, technologi-
cal progress has been recognized as the domi-
nant factor in determining the rate of growth.
This is presumably even more true for develop-
ing countries, for which the possibilities of clos-
ing the knowledge gap with advanced industrial
countries offers especially large growth poten-
tial. We examine the impact of trade restrictions
in economies in which technological spillovers
within countries and across industries are fun-
damental to the process of growth (see Kenneth
J. Arrow, 1962a, 1962b; Paul M. Romer, 1986;
Stiglitz, 1987). Since that work, it has been
clear that markets, by themselves, do not nec-
essarily, or in general, lead to overall dynamic
efficiency; and that there are often trade-offs
between static inefficiencies (e.g., associated
with patent protection) and long-term growth.
We find, here in particular, that the dynamic
benefits of broad trade restrictions may out-
weigh their static costs. Our analysis provides
the basis of an infant economy (as opposed to an
infant industry) argument for protection.
This paper develops a simple two-sector
model with an industrial (modern) and a tradi-
tional (craft or agricultural) sector. There are
four key features to the model: (a) there are
spillovers from the industrial sector to the craft
sector, for which firms in the industrial sector
are not compensated; (b) such spillovers are
geographically based, that is, it is only produc-
tivity increases in the industrial sector in the
developing countries that affect productivity in-
creases in the traditional sector; (c) innovations
are concentrated in the industrial sector; and (d)
size is among the important determinants of the
pace of innovation in the industrial sector.
Earlier critiques of trade policies encouraging
the development of the industrial sector in de-
veloping countries ignored these spillovers.
They argued, in effect, that Korea would always
have a comparative advantage in growing rice;
therefore, it was foolish for it to try to restrict
imports of industrial goods, even if by so doing
productivity in the industrial goods sector was
increased. It could never catch up, so the pro-
tection would have to be permanent. Year after
year, the country would have been better off if
it simply specialized in its own comparative
advantage, growing rice. Korea could, and did,
catch up, however, at least in certain areas. If
catch-up is possible, then dynamic comparative
advantage differs from static comparative ad-
vantage. But even if Korea’s comparative ad-
vantage remained in agriculture, industrial
protection might be desirable, because by sup-
porting it, one might have a more dynamic
agricultural (traditional) sector. Trade restric-
tions enhance the size of the industrial sector;
the benefits spill over to the rural sector; and
national income grows at a possibly far faster
pace. After presenting the model, we explain
why the underlying hypotheses are plausible
and argue that the model is broadly consistent
with historical experience and empirical
evidence.
I. The Basic Model
We will consider a highly simplified world
consisting of two economies—one developed
(D) and the other less developed (L). (The lim-
itation to two economies is inessential; our
model could equally consist of multiple (iden-
tical) versions of each of the two types of econ-
omies.) These economies produce two types
of goods— one industrial (I) and the other
agricultural/craft ( A). (Again, we could eas-
ily extend the model to include a multiplicity
of goods in each category.) Both are produced
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using only labor as an input, with technolo-
gies that at any point in time embody con-
stant-returns-to-scale. We define:
● CID (CAD)  amount of labor per unit of in-
dustrial (agricultural) output in the developed
economy;
● CIL (CAL)  amount of labor per unit of indus-
trial (agricultural) output in the less-
developed economy.
We assume that the developed economy enjoys
absolute advantages in the production of both
goods (i.e., CID  CIL and CAD  CAL), but that the
less-developed economy enjoys a comparative ad-







We further assume that the developed econ-
omy is very large relative to the less-developed
economy, in particular, that it is capable of
supporting the entire global demand for indus-
trial output and at the same time producing
significant amounts of agricultural/craft output.
Thus, in equilibrium, the less-developed econ-
omy is fully specialized in agricultural/craft
production, while the developed economy pro-
duces both goods.
Prices will be determined by the trade-off in
the developed economy between the cost of
producing the industrial good and the cost of
producing the agricultural/craft good. If we des-
ignate the agricultural/craft good as numeraire
with price unity, then the price of the industrial
good in the developed economy will be
PID  CID/CAD
and wages in the industrial economy will be
WD  1/CAD.
In the less-developed economy, again using
the agricultural/craft output as numeraire with
price unity, the wage level will be
WL  1/CAL,
which is, of course, lower than the wage level in
the developed economy since CAL  CAD.
A. Free Trade Equilibrium
Since CID/CAD  CIL/CAL, industrial production
in the less-developed economy is not economi-
cally viable. It specializes in agriculture. The
composition of consumption in the less-devel-
oped economy is then determined by the real
price, pID. The composition of output in the
industrial economy is determined by the global
demand (its own demand plus the imports of the
less-developed economy) for industrial goods.
Finally, note that in this simple static equilib-
rium all the gains from trade accrue to the
less-developed economy.
B. Dynamic Development
We now introduce technological progress
into this static equilibrium. Formally, we will
assume, first, that productivity improvement af-
fects the industrial and agricultural/craft sectors
equally, i.e.,











dt CICA CICA  1CI  dCIdt  1CA  dCAdt  0.
Whatever drives productivity, increases spill-
over—fully, from one sector within the econ-
omy to the other. This has one important
simplifying implication: productivity growth
does not affect the price of industrial goods
relative to agricultural/craft goods. (Our results
require only that there be some spillovers from
the industrial to the traditional sector within a
country.) Productivity growth results from (a)
research and development efforts which, while
originally devoted to one sector, have benefits
that inevitably spill over to other sectors; (b)
human capital improvements, which, again
while they arise in one sector, inevitably mi-
grate with labor to other sectors of the economy;
and (c) the accumulated knowledge and atten-
tion of managers and engineers, which, al-
though developed in one sector, also naturally
migrates to other sectors.
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Next, we assume that the rate of technologi-
cal progress, g, is determined by








 f Q1Q1QA, f0 0, f 1 0
where QI is the output of the industrial sector
and QA is the output of the agricultural/crafts
sector. This assumes that the forces driving pro-
ductivity growth originate in the industrial sec-
tor of the economy and have an aggregate
impact that is proportional to the (relative) size
of the industrial sector.
The process of productivity growth described
by equations (1) and (2) has important long-run
consequences for our two economies. The less-
developed economy, with QIL  0, stagnates.
Without an industrial sector there is no produc-
tivity growth. In contrast, the developed econ-
omy experiences productivity growth at a rate
gD  f  QIDQID  QAD
where the composition of output is deter-
mined increasingly by its own demands for
output, since the less-developed economy be-
comes a progressively smaller part of the
overall global economy. Asymptotically, gD
will converge to a rate of growth determined
by developed economy conditions alone.
Over time, the less-developed economy falls
farther and farther behind its developed
counterpart.
C. The Role of Trade Policy
Consider now the consequences of a ban on
industrial imports by the less-developed country
(or equivalently the imposition of prohibitively
high tariffs). The result would be an immediate
welfare loss as it substituted high-cost, domestic
industrial production for lower-cost imports
from the developed economy. In the new autar-
kic equilibrium, however, industrial output in
the less-developed economy would no longer be
zero, and productivity growth would now occur.
Just as in the case of the developed economy, a
high-tariff, less-developed economy would pro-
duce a mix of outputs dependent on its own
demands for industrial and agricultural/craft





If we designate the resulting industrial output by
QIL, then the rate of productivity growth will
increase from zero to
gL  f  QILQIL  QAL .
Eventually the benefits of this dynamic im-
provement in productivity will outweigh the
short-term inefficiencies associated with high-
cost, local industrial production. The country
will be better off. Whether the present dis-
counted value of welfare is higher depends on
how high gL* is, and how low the discount
rate is. Thus, in this context, trade barriers
may enhance rather than impair economic
welfare.
II. The Industrial Sector as the Source of
Innovation and Spillovers
A. Knowledge Production
The key assumption here is that the industrial
sector is the source of innovation. The justifi-
cations for such an assumption are rooted in the
nature of industrial activity. Such activity takes
place in firms that (relative to firms in the other
sector) are large, long-lived, stable, and densely
concentrated geographically. Agricultural/craft
production, by contrast, typically takes place on
a highly decentralized basis among many small,
short-lived, unstable firms. We have also as-
sumed that there are important spillovers,
not only within the sector, but to the agricul-
tural/craft sector. These spillovers involve
knowledge, human capital, and institutional de-
velopment. There are several channels through
which the specific characteristics of the indus-
trial sector get translated into higher productiv-
ity growth for the economy as a whole.
Resources and Incentives for Research and
Development.—Since particular innovations
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are far more valuable to large organizations,
which can apply them to many units of out-
put, than to smaller ones with lower levels of
output (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Arrow,
1962b), there is far greater incentive to en-
gage in R&D in the industrial sector than in
the agricultural/craft sector. The result will be
higher innovation investments in the former
sector than in the latter.
Stability and Continuity.—The accumulation
of knowledge on which productivity growth is
based is necessarily cumulative. This, in turn,
greatly depends on a stable organization for
preserving and disseminating the knowledge in-
volved, and on continuity in jobs and personnel
to support these processes. In large organiza-
tions, with the resources to provide redundant
capacity where needed, the required degree of
stability and continuity is much more likely to
be present than in small, dispersed organiza-
tions where the loss of single individuals may
completely compromise the process of knowl-
edge accumulation. As a result, steady produc-
tivity improvement will be more likely to
arise from industrial than agricultural/craft
production.
The Ability to Support Public R&D.—Large-
scale, densely concentrated activities are far
easier to tax than small-scale, dispersed activi-
ties. Thus, economies with large, accessible in-
dustrial sectors will be far better able to support
publicly sponsored R&D than those consisting
largely of dispersed, small-scale agricultural/
craft production units. This factor may be espe-
cially important in the support of agricultural
research, like that undertaken by Agricultural
Extension Service in the United States. These
activities directly contribute to agricultural pro-
ductivity growth, but could not be supported
without a taxable base of industrial activity.
Human Capital Accumulation.—Opportuni-
ties and incentives for accumulating general
human capital are likely to be far greater in
large, complex industrial enterprises with a
wide range of interdependent activities than in a
small, dispersed, narrowly focused agricultural/
craft enterprises. The resulting human capital
accumulation is a critical element in both de-
veloping the innovations on which productivity
growth depends and in disseminating them as
workers move between enterprises and across
sectors.
Public Support for Human Capital Accumu-
lation.—Just as in R&D, private capital market
failures may mean that public support, in the
form of free primary and secondary education,
is a critical component of general human capital
accumulation. Again, the greater susceptibility
of concentrated, industrial enterprises to taxa-
tion is key to funding. As they migrate between
sectors, ultimately higher productivity growth
in the agricultural/craft sector will be engen-
dered as well.
Concentration and Diffusion of Knowledge.
—Diffusion of knowledge among densely col-
located, large-scale industrial enterprises is
likely to be far more rapid than diffusion of
knowledge among dispersed, small-scale agri-
cultural/craft enterprises. The resulting econo-
mies of scale associated with these spillovers
are, therefore, likely to be greater in industrial
than in agricultural/craft economies.
Monitoring and Physical Capital Investment
and the Development of a Robust Financial
Sector.—Although physical capital is not an
explicit part of our model, it can be readily
extended to include physical capital investment.
Greater investment should lead to higher levels
of productivity both directly, through capital
deepening and the embodiment of technical
progress (Solow, 1957), and indirectly, as the
capital goods industry is a source of innovation.
Investment, in turn, requires that suppliers of
capital be able to monitor the performance of
firms, and/or that institutions for doing this ex-
ist. Industrial firms, because of their large scale,
should be less costly to monitor. Hence, an
industrial environment should be characterized
by a more highly-developed financial sector
than an agricultural/craft environment. Once de-
veloped, a strong financial sector facilitates cap-
ital deployment throughout the economy, even
in the rural sector.
Learning to Learn and Cross-Border Knowl-
edge Flows.—Success in the industrial sector
requires knowledge and the ability to acquire
knowledge that is common across borders.
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Some of this knowledge and these abilities are
relevant to the agricultural sector and dis-
seminate to it through mechanisms already
described.
B. Knowledge Transmission
What matters is how knowledge (productivity
increases) are generated and transmitted. We have
described some of the mechanisms (e.g., labor
mobility) through which dissemination across sec-
tors occurs. Our analysis assumed that spillovers
are concentrated within national boundaries. This
assumption rests on four factors: geographical
proximity; international restrictions of movement
of labor (and associated movements in knowledge
and human capital); language barriers; and histor-
ical patterns of social interactions, which are
strongly affected by national boundaries. The re-
sults of our analysis, however, require only that
transmission of knowledge in the agricultural/craft
sector be stronger within a country. Indeed, our
results are strengthened if there is some element of
transmission across countries within the industrial
sector, so long as that transmission increases with
the size of the industrial sector in the developing
country. For the developing country, there is a
further reason for promoting the industrial sector:
it is the window to the world, the channel through
which more advanced knowledge gets transmitted
to the developing country for both industry and
agriculture. A manufacturer of textiles, for in-
stance, absorbs information about textile produc-
tion from other countries (perhaps because he
buys machines from other countries). But some of
that knowledge may be relevant for the agricul-
tural sector.
III. Theory and Evidence
There has been a widespread presumption
that free trade is good for growth. Yet, the most
successful countries, both today (in East Asia)
and historically (including the United States),
not only engaged in trade restrictions, but those
restrictions were an explicit part of their growth
strategies. Even war times, in which trade is
interrupted, have often seemed to be periods of
enormous dynamic gains.
Much of that presumption is based on the
observed correlation between growth and trade.
But correlation does not prove causality, which
may well run from growth to trade. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the absence of a
strong relationship between liberalization and
growth (see Andrew H. Charlton and Stiglitz,
2005). Trading opportunities available through
globalization are universal; yet growth has been
highly particular, both across countries (even
among those that have liberalized) and within
individual countries, over time. It is particular
local conditions that determine whether univer-
sal trade opportunities lead to growth. Our in-
terpretation is also consistent with numerous
historical experiences, including those noted
below.
What about countries like India and China,
which have liberalized and grown? A closer
look at the timing shows that their takeoff oc-
curred prior to trade liberalization, though in
both cases it was associated with internal liber-
alization (see Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subra-
manian, 2005). Reducing domestic distortions,
while maintaining external barriers, provides
precisely the conditions for the dynamic gains
identified in this paper.
IV. History and Policy
Our analysis can be used to derive an optimal
tariff, balancing the long-term benefits of fos-
tering industrial growth against the short-term
costs of inefficient acquisition of industrial
products. The model has more general implica-
tions about the nature of such tariffs, however.
First, tariffs should be broadly and uniformly
applied to industrial products. Since the benefits
sought are broadly rather than narrowly deter-
mined, there should be no attempt to pick win-
ners by supporting particular industries. This
has the added benefit of avoiding the creation of
narrowly focused special interests concerned
with sustaining particular tariffs beyond their
natural economic lifetime. Properly designed,
both the costs and the benefits of a uniform
industrial tariff system should be widely dis-
persed. Second, a broadly based industrial tariff
system should be, to some extent, naturally self-
limiting. Successful local industries should be-
gin to export and, therefore, be naturally
predisposed to favor free trade. Finally, it may
well be that individual national markets are too
small to support robust local industries. In that
case, the natural extension of the basic policy is
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to combine local economies at similar stages of
industrial development into free-trade areas,
which are then protected by common uniform,
external industrial tariff business.
Ultimately, the test of the effectiveness of
such uniform, infant-economy tariff policies is
how well they have worked in practice; and
here, at least superficially, the historical record
is encouraging. The trade policy of the newly
formed European Economic Community (EEC)
was, in the 1950s, one of high, but relatively
uniform, external tariff barriers. The growth of the
EEC behind these barriers was rapid. Similarly,
Asian economics like Japan, Korea, China, Tai-
wan, and Singapore have favored broad rather
than narrowly tailored barriers to trade, and they
have all experienced strong growth. In its early
history, the United States also tended to favor high
and broadly applied industrial tariffs and suc-
ceeded in fostering high levels of growth.
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